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A Risk Assessment1 
 
The Land Registration Act 2002 has been received with much critical acclaim, and 
rightly so. It is a work of monumental importance and monumental effort. Law 
Commission Report No. 2712 was itself the last in a long series of Reports discussing, 
proposing, rejecting and recommending changes to the fundamentals of the land 
registration system established by the Land Registration Act 1925.3 As is well known, the 
Act of 2002, which is now set for entry in to force on October 13 2003,4 is designed to 
revolutionise conveyancing in England and Wales and to bring the land registration 
system established by the 1925 Land Registration Act into the modern age.5 Indeed, in 
terms of its underlying rationale, the Act of 2002 shares much with its 1925 counterpart. 
Both were born of the recognition that the systems they were designed to replace were 
(and are) no longer suitable for the social and economic conditions of the time. The 1925 
Act is still seen by some as an interloper, polluting the purity of the historic principles of 
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ancient property law and the 2002 Act arouses suspicion and trepidation in similar 
measure for those who are now comfortable with the amended provisions of the 1925 
legislation. Both reflect the new “technology” of their age (the introduction of the 
widespread use of registers and e-commerce respectively) and it was just as uncertain 
whether the system of the 1925 Act would work as it is now uncertain whether electronic 
conveyancing will actually deliver all the anticipated benefits.6 Fundamentally, both Acts 
are directed principally to simplifying the processes by which land transactions are 
carried out and any substantive changes found in the two pieces of legislation can be 
regarded as ancillary to, and supportive of, this primary purpose. Lest we think this is too 
high a claim for the 2002 Act, Law Commission Report No. 271 makes it clear in its 
opening paragraph that “[t]he purpose of the Bill [sic.] is a bold and striking one. It is to 
create the necessary legal framework in which registered conveyancing can be conducted 
electronically”.7 Of course, the Land Registration Act 1925 had partner legislation in the 
Law of Property Act 1925, the Settled Land Act 1925, the Trustee Act 1925 and the 
Administration of Estates Act 1925 and so itself is not so directly concerned with 
substantive matters. Thus, while the Act of 2002 is very clearly “transaction driven”, with 
all reform being bent deliberately and methodically towards the goal of e-conveyancing, 
it also indulges in wide ranging substantive law reform in support of this goal. There is, 
to use the words of the Law Commission, a very considerable “legal framework” put in 
place. As one would expect, this reform of the substantive law is well referenced to the 
primary goal of e-conveyancing and, for the most part, the reasons for the changes to the 
substantive law are persuasive assuming e-conveyancing is in place.8 But, that system is 
not yet with us. 
 It is not the purpose of this analysis to challenge the assumption that all efforts 
must be bent towards establishing a system of e-conveyancing or to embark on a detailed 
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assessment of those provisions of the Act directly concerned with that task.9 Nor does the 
author underestimate the complexities of the legal, financial and administrative 
framework that must be put in place before the new system can come into operation.10 
However, while much attention is rightly given to the fundamental purpose of the 2002 
Act, it is important to assess the considerable impact of the Act on those “everyday” 
principles of land registration that currently regulate over £2000 billion worth of 
property.11 As has been said already, many – perhaps most12- of these consequential 
substantive changes13 are designed to facilitate and encourage the new conveyancing 
processes and to make a reality of the desire to move from registration of title to title by 
registration where it “will be the fact of registration and registration alone that confers 
title”.14 Yet, given that these substantive changes are certain to come into force before the 
e-conveyancing provisions, even though they are to a large extent parasitic on those 
provisions, what will be their impact in an e-conveyancing-free climate? More 
importantly, is there a possibility that the substantive law reforms will produce 
unwelcome or unexpected effects because they are not located in an e-conveyancing 
system? Is it possible that the effect of the substantive reforms will be different before 
and after the introduction of e-conveyancing and, most of all, is there an opportunity for 
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the courts to exploit any uncertainties in the legislation to undo or undermine the system 
of e-conveyancing before it becomes operative?  
In order to address these questions, this essay examines a number of the 
“parasitic” changes to substantive law, both in their relation to the central goal of e-
conveyancing and in their own right as amendments to the law of land registration. Of 
course, it must be accepted at the outset that these changes were not designed to stand 
alone, even if they could in fact be justified without the conveyancing imperative, and 
thus any adverse comment on the relevant provisions of the Act is itself open to criticism. 
However, it bears repetition that many of the changes actually will stand-alone for a 
period of time – perhaps a considerable period of time - and they will come into effect 
without the protective cloak of e-conveyancing. They will change the face of land of 
registered title before the first byte of e-conveyancing. 
 
A: The transformation of overriding interests into interests that override. 
 
There is, perhaps, no other creation of the Land Registration Act 1925 that has aroused as 
much fierce comment as the infamous section 70(1) and its list of overriding interests. 
The very fact that there is a category of property right that can bind a purchaser of a 
registered title without either that interest appearing on the register or necessarily being 
discoverable is thought by many to be an anathema to the very idea of a registration 
system. After all, why have a system of title registration if the registered entry is not 
conclusive as to important adverse interests? To others, among which the present author 
can be counted, there is nothing inherently wrong with a category of non-registrable 
binding right, even in a system of land registration. After all, pre-1926 property law 
coped with the concept of legal rights ipso facto binding transferees and there was no 
certainty that all such rights were discoverable by inspection of the title documents or the 
land itself. Again, although the analogy is not perfect, a person would not usually buy a 
car by sight only of the registration document, so we might think that a prudent purchaser 
might wish to inspect the property (and hence discover much about it) irrespective of the 
state of the register.15 So also, policy might dictate that there should be a class of right 
that binds a registered title despite the fact of its non-registration. Obligations of general 
public utility, such as the burden of maintaining sea walls and public rights of way, are an 
obvious example. But, “policy” can mean more than this and it could be thought socially 
and economically politic to ensure that the property rights of those who do not have the 
protection of a formal acknowledgement of their rights, but who nevertheless occupy 
land as their home, should be protected without the need to register.16 For, theory aside, 
the act of registration “against” another’s land, especially the land of one’s emotional 
partner (as would be required without the protective cloak of s.70(1)(g) LRA 1925), is 
readily seen as an hostile act. It seems to scream “I don’t trust you!” 
Of course, we no longer live in 1925 and legislation drafted in the early part of the 
last century is unlikely to be suited to the needs of  the early part of the present one. More 
importantly, it is unarguable that changes in the substance of land law and in the way in 
which land is now used have turned section 70(1) LRA 1925 into a different creature 
from that envisaged by the drafters of 1925 Act. The development of principles 
permitting (some might say encouraging) the informal acquisition of interests in land – 
such as resulting and constructive trusts and proprietary estoppel – have dramatically 
increased both the chance that an adverse right might exist and that it might be 
undiscoverable, being neither materially recorded nor necessarily obvious to our prudent 
purchaser. Likewise, the rise to prominence of a different kind of “purchaser”, the 
institutional mortgagee, and the importance of such lending to the domestic economy17 
has both exposed the latent power of section 70(1) and released a tidal wave of litigation 
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that may still not have abated.18 So, despite the fact that the case against overriding 
interests is not watertight, there are powerful arguments in favour of reform irrespective 
of the imperative of e-conveyancing, although whether such reform would ever have 
reached the statute book without the e-conveyancing dimension is open to question. 
Perhaps the “defects” would not have been thought defective enough to warrant root and 
branch reform. However, when the objective is to wholly re-shape the way land is 
transferred and to make the register both the evidence and the origin of the legal validity 
of a person’s title, achieved on-line with the absolute minimum of additional enquiries, 
then any diminution in the integrity of the register has to be minimised. Indeed, we 
should remember that although there is much talk of the “simultaneous” transfer and 
registration of titles and of third-party rights in land, this is inaccurate. It is not so much 
that the act of transfer/creation must occur at the same time as the act of registration; it is 
rather that the act of registration is the act of transfer/creation. Not only that, the act of 
registration (creation/transfer) must in due course be done electronically and not 
otherwise.19 Clearly, the current large category of overriding interests cannot survive this 
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. The trail of litigation starts with Pettitt v Pettitt and the acceptance that, in the right case, a co-habitee 
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.  See section 93 LRA 2002 and the power to require such registration for matters specified in the Rules. It 
provides that a disposition or a contract to make a disposition of a registered estate or charge, or a third 
party right subject to the entry of a notice on the register “only has effect if it is made by means of a 
document in electronic form and if, when the document purports to take effect….it is electronically 
communicated to the registrar and the relevant registration requirements are met”. Thus, dispositions 
purported to be made in material form (or communicated to the registrar in material form) will create or 
transfer nothing at all. This goes much further than the existing principles of registration where failure to 
- or rather, if they do, then the dream of e-conveyancing and title by registration cannot 
survive in the form found in the LRA 2002. Thus, it is with some justification that the 
Law Commission sees the existence of overriding interests as a “major obstacle” to its 
goal20 and although there was a brief flirtation with the idea of abolishing the concept 
altogether, in the result the 2002 Act lays the axe to the tree with some vigour by both 
minimising the occasions on which an “interest that overrides” can affect a registered title 
and by encouraging the registration of interests that might otherwise take effect as such.  
Apart from the change of name,21 the first significant matter of note is that the Act 
now recognises that the effect of an interest that overrides depends on whether it is 
challenging a first registration of title or a disposition of a title that is already registered. 
Thus, interests overriding a first registration are dealt with in Schedule 1 (and made 
effective by sections 11(4)(b) and 12(4)(c) of the Act) and those overriding a registered 
disposition are dealt with in Schedule 3 (and made effective by sections 29(2)(a)(ii) and 
30(2)(a)(ii) of the Act) and the simple effect of the distinction is that more interests will 
override a first registration and in a wider range of circumstances than will override a 
disposition of an already registered title. Schedule 1 is wider than Schedule 3. There is a 
double rationale for this. First, that the act of first registration itself (being in this sense 
purely administrative) should neither enhance nor diminish the effect of a proprietary 
right over land. That which did not bind before should not bind after registration and vice 
versa. Of this principle surely there can be little complaint. For example, equitable 
easements over land of unregistered title qualify as Class D (iii) land charges under s.2 
(5) (iii) LCA 1972 and so must be registered to bind a purchaser of a legal estate in the 
land. It would be destructive of the parties’ pre-existing legal relationship and of the 
policy of the LCA 1925 if by the mere act of first registration, an unregistered Class D 
(iii) equitable easement could become an interest that overrides. Hence equitable 
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. Perhaps the intention is to signal the downgrading of the importance of these rights or to indicate that pre 
2002 Act interpretations of the meaning and scope of “overriding interests” should not necessarily carry 
over?  
easements are excluded from Schedule 1.22 Similarly, although paragraph 2 of Schedule 1 
confers overriding status on an “interest belonging to a person in actual occupation, so far 
as relating to land of which he is in actual occupation, except for an interest under a 
settlement under the Settled Land Act 1925”, this can refer only to those rights which, at 
the time of first registration, are already binding on the applicant for first registration.23 
Such rights would be binding prior to first registration primarily because the applicant 
had notice of the rights (the rights not being registrable as land charges),24 or when the 
application for first registration is voluntary (i.e. not triggered by a dealing with the 
unregistered land), where the applicant is bound inter partes by the right. In neither case 
should the newly registered proprietor be able to escape the right by an act of first 
registration even if it would have become void against a purchaser had he sold the land.25 
The second rationale is that, given that a major aim of the new legislation is to 
ensure that the register provides as accurate a picture as possible of the legal state of the 
land, the interval between a first registration and a first registered disposition is seen as an 
opportunity to ensure that more rights come onto the register (even if they could override) 
and to deny overriding status thereafter to those that contradict the paramount policies of 
the Act. There is in consequence a duty under s.71 (b) of the Act on a person applying for 
registration of a disposition to disclose information about rights which may fall within 
Schedule 326 and, as noted above, the scope of rights within Schedule 3 is narrower than 
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. A knowledgeable estate owner of  unregistered title might, therefore, sell the land in order to defeat 
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. Rule 55 of the draft rules. The duty also extends to applicants for first registration concerning Schedule 1 
rights, s. 71(a) and draft rule 27. The penalty for failure to provide the relevant information is not made 
clear. Note also that under s. 37 LRA 2002, “if it appears to the registrar that a registered estate is subject to 
an unregistered interest” he may enter a notice in respect of Schedule 1 rights (with some exceptions: see 
section 33 LRA 2002), thus removing their overriding status and putting them on the register.  
those of Schedule 1.27 Two further points may be made here. First, that it remains to be 
seen whether the combination of an efficient e-conveyancing system, the section 71 duty 
or the penalty of voidness (where it operates) really does encourage registration of rights 
in the interval between first registration and the first registered disposition. This rather 
suggests a degree of knowledge and understanding on the part of right holders (and their 
advisers) that might not exist. Secondly, given that the legislation denies continuing 
overriding status to certain property rights on the occasion of a registered disposition 
irrespective of the circumstances surrounding that disposition and despite the fact that 
they were effective at first registration, this might be thought to amount to a deprivation 
of property contrary to Article 1 of Protocol 1 to the European Convention on Human 
Rights etc. under the Human Rights Act 1998.28 If so, this would trigger an investigation 
into the public utility of the legislation to assess its compatibility with human rights law. 
However, we must exercise caution here, because it remains to be seen whether many 
rights will in practice cease to be overriding on a registered disposition where they were 
overriding on a first registration because of the LRA 2002 such as to trigger a human 
rights challenge. For example, many rights may be effective at first registration against 
the applicant simply because the applicant created the right in the first place and their 
subsequent voidness against a purchaser under a registrable disposition will be nothing 
more than a repeat of the rule we have now as to transactions concerning third parties. 
Thus, where A grants an option to purchase unregistered land to X which is not then 
registered as a land charge under LCA 1972, this remains effective against A after A 
applies for voluntary first registration because A granted it. If A then sells under 
registered disposition to B, the option is not an interest that overrides under Schedule 3 
(absent patent actual occupation) and so is voided. But, it is voided not because of a 
difference between Schedule 1 and Schedule 3, but because of an application of normal 
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. The prime examples are legal easements and the rights of persons in actual occupation, being more 
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small number of persons may be affected by this problem does not mean that the provisions will be human 
rights compatible. 
principles. So, for a human rights challenge to arise, we would be looking for a right 
binding at first registration because of Schedule 1, but ceasing to bind on a registrable 
disposition because of Schedule 3. This could be rare in practice. A possible example is 
where A conveys an unregistered title to B subject to X’s legal easement which binds B 
as a legal right effective against the whole world. B applies for first registration of title 
and the legal easement becomes an interest that overrides under para. 1 Schedule 1 LRA 
2002. However, should B then convey to C by registered disposition, X’s right would not 
be an interest that overrides C’s estate under Schedule 3 if the legal easement was not 
within the actual knowledge of C, not registered under the Commons Registration Act 
1965, not been exercised within one year of the disposition and not obvious on a 
reasonably careful inspection of the land. The effect of Schedule 3 in these circumstances 
would be to deny effectiveness to a right guaranteed under Schedule 1 without any 
“fault” on the part of X, the owner of the easement. Indeed, although B may well have 
been under a duty because of section 71 to provide information that would have ensured 
that the legal easement could have been entered on the register, B’s failure in this regard 
presumably cannot affect the innocent and unknowing owner of the legal easement. The 
result is that X is deprived of his right against the land because he now falls under 
Schedule 3, not Schedule 1. Admittedly, such cases may be rare (and perhaps can be 
tolerated for that reason), but much will turn on how courts interpret Schedule 3 rights, 
particularly the provisions concerning the discoverability of legal easements and the 
meaning of “patent” actual occupation that are not applicable under Schedule 1. An 
interpretation that shrinks the category of Schedule 3 rights by taking a narrow view of 
these provisions, despite the fact that the same rights in unchanged circumstances would 
have been binding under Schedule 1, could be a recipe for litigation and uncertainty. 
In addition to this re-classification of “interests that override” according to the 
type of transaction they are to affect, the Act also radically alters the type of right that can 
have overriding status in the first place. The result is a considerably slimmer set of rights 
under both Schedules than those that take effect under s.70 (1) LRA 1925. As a very 
general guide, the 2002 Act provides that the following rights may override a first 
registration or a registered disposition, as they case may be. First, legal leases of 7 years 
or less, with certain exceptions some of which are specific only to Schedule 3;29 
secondly, interests of persons in actual occupation, but where the category is significantly 
limited in comparison with section 70(1)(g) LRA 1925, particularly in relation to 
Schedule 3 rights;30 thirdly, legal easements and profits, but once again restricted under 
Schedule 3;31 fourthly, customary, public and mineral rights and local land charges;32 
fifthly, a miscellany of rights such as franchises and manors, some feudal in origin;33 and 
finally, although not listed in either Schedule, a Public Private Partnership (PPP) lease 
also enjoys the status of a right that overrides.34  
 
(i) Rights recognised as within s. 70(1) LRA 1925 but now omitted from Schedules 1 and 
3 LRA 2002 
 
Under the new scheme, there are a number of deliberate omissions from both Schedule 1 
and 3 (when compared to s. 70(1) LRA 1925) though that is not to say that the 
substantive rights apparently omitted may not find some protection elsewhere in the 
Schedules or be otherwise protected by the legislation. There are a number of examples. 
First, equitable easements are deliberately omitted from the Schedules, despite being 
recognised as overriding interests within s.70 (1)(a) LRA 1925 as a result of the decision 
in Celsteel v Alton. The rationale for their exclusion from Schedule 1 has been noted 
above and their removal from Schedule 3 further advances the aim of ensuring that the 
register provides a near accurate picture of the legal state of the land. Interestingly, 
however, Law Commission Report No. 254, originally proposed that expressly granted 
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. The exceptions must therefore be registered to be effective against a third party even though they are of 
7 years or less duration. See paragraph 1 of both Schedules. 
30
. Paragraphs 2 of  both Schedules. 
31
. Paragraphs 3 of  both Schedules. 
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. Paragraphs 4, 5, 7-9 and 6 respectively of both Schedules and in identical terms. 
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 . Paragraphs 10-14 of both Schedules and in identical terms. 
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.  Section 90 LRA 2002, where PPP leases for the purpose of this Act are defined as “leases created for 
public-private partnerships relating to transport in London” (s.90 (6)). These are special statutory creations 
relating to the transport system in London and are included only because of their special character and with 
some reluctance on the part of the Law Commission. See Report No. 271 para. 8.11 et seq 
easements should lose overriding status (because being expressly created they should be 
registered), but that all impliedly granted easements should continue to be overriding.35 
In other words, the original proposal was to trigger overriding status by reference to the 
method of creation (express or implied) rather than the effect of creation (legal or 
equitable). The 2002 Act, however, uses the legal/equitable distinction as the touchstone 
for inclusion within Schedules 1 and 3. In consequence, this means that impliedly granted 
equitable easements do not enjoy overriding status, even though they are by definition not 
expressly mentioned in a contract or other written instrument and so may easily be 
overlooked for registration.36 This could have an adverse impact in two circumstances. 
First, impliedly created equitable easements of necessity, common intention or under the 
rule in Wheeldon v Burrows37 no longer carry overriding status. Of course, given that 
most express contracts concerning land exclude the creation of such easements, this may 
not turn out to be a significant problem, but there is further potential here for litigation 
and uncertainty.38 In this regard, we should note the recent obiter dicta in K Sultana 
Saeed v Plustrade,39 which suggests that certain types of easement can qualify as an 
overriding interest under s. 70(1)(g) LRA 1925 because the claimant was in actual 
occupation of the portion of land subject to the easement: in this case, by using the 
parking space that was the subject matter of the easement. While there may well be 
doubts about whether the “actual occupation” provisions of s.70(1)(g) LRA (and hence of 
Schedules 1 and 3 of LRA 2002) support this type of “occupation”, it is easy to see how 
certain types of equitable easement may nevertheless squeeze into the new categories of 
“interests that override” through a flexible interpretation of their provisions. Secondly, 
easements generated by proprietary estoppel are necessarily equitable and there is no 
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. Note, under the transitional provisions, any easement or profit which is an overriding interest at the time 
the Act comes into force, but would cease to be under Schedule 3, will retain its overriding status, Schedule 
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. [1879] 12 ChD 31 
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. In the case of easements impliedly granted as part of an equitable lease, it is arguable that the equitable 
easement will partake of the overriding status of the equitable lease (if any). 
39
. (2002) 25 EG 154. But see Epps v Esso Petroleum [1973] 1 WLR  1071. 
written instrument at all by which their existence may be discovered or which may propel 
a right holder to register. Moreover, even though the inchoate equity of estoppel is now to 
be regarded as proprietary in nature (see section 116 LRA 2002), the right (inchoate or 
crystallised) must still fall within the protective ambit of the legislation and this might be 
difficult for easements.40 In other words, making the overriding status of easements 
dependant on their legal or equitable character, rather than the manner in which they 
arose (expressly or impliedly) will remove a large category of right from the Schedules, 
but it does not sit well with the policy behind the rules on implied creation. Why insist 
that a person may not derogate from their grant or indulge in unconscionable conduct 
(and thus generate a right) only to see the right destroyed on a sale of the land. A 
reluctance to allow this could force strained interpretations of the 2002 Act in the same 
way that Celsteel v Alton and now K Sultana Saeed v Plustrade have done with the 1925 
registration statute. 
 A second major change is that the Schedules make no mention of the rights of 
persons acquiring or having acquired rights under the Limitation Acts. The rights of 
adverse possessors  per se will no longer be overriding. In fact, however, this is not as 
drastic a change as might first appear. Law Commission Report No. 271 makes it clear 
that the rights of adverse possessors will override a first registration or a registered 
disposition if the adverse possessor is in actual occupation of the land according to the 
terms of the respective Schedules. In other words, an absent adverse possessor has no 
protection. On balance, this seems a fair compromise between the rights of the 
purchasing third party and the adverse possessor and it was well supported by the 
consultation process.41 Of course, there may be difficulties over the meaning of “actual 
occupation” especially in the light of the provisions of Schedule 3 as they apply to semi-
derelict land where the initial acts of  adverse possession may be slight and the evidence 
of  “patent” actual occupation very slim. However, it may well be that cases of adverse 
possessors in the process of acquiring rights but who are not in actual occupation will be 
rare in practice, and for adverse possessors who have acquired rights, the legislation 
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 . It seems that only the actual occupation provisions of the Schedules will offer this protection, but that 
may well not suffice for estoppel easements, K Sultana aside.  
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. Report No. 271 para. 8.78, noting an approval of over 80% of those who commented. 
already provides mechanisms by which the adverse possession can claim the registered 
title, with provisions of like intent found in LRA 2002.42 Importantly, the rights of 
persons who have acquired the right to be registered as proprietor (i.e. who have 
completed the relevant period of adverse possession) but who have left the land without 
such registration will cease to be overriding, unless the issue is one of first registration 
where the applicant will be bound by the rights of adverse possessors of which he had 
notice, irrespective of actual occupation (sections 11(4)(c) and 14(4)(d) LRA 2002). 
Although this may well be perceived as an attack on the very notion of adverse 
possession, it does in fact serve two policy masters: it further protects a purchaser from 
undiscoverable and unregistered but binding rights and, perhaps unintentionally, it can be 
seen as supporting the one of the justifications for adverse possession by disapplying the 
claim to title of one who is not utilising the land economically or socially. In fact, the 
change away from automatic protection of the rights of adverse possessors also 
encapsulates one of the major philosophical pillars of the new Act: that in a registration 
system, possession alone should not generate title. This change in the manner of the 
protection given to adverse possessors is thus a counterpart to the emasculation of the 
concept of adverse possession in registered land.43 
 Thirdly, overriding status is no longer accorded to the rights of persons in receipt 
of rents and profits of the land. Formerly, as is well known, this sat somewhat 
uncomfortably within s.70 (1)(g) LRA 1925 but it finds no counterpart in Schedules 1 
and 3, either on its own account or as part of the “actual occupation” provisions. It is 
clear from Law Commission Report No. 254, that the proposal to remove the overriding 
status of the rights of such persons was controversial,44 especially as it might cause 
substantial loss to intermediate landlords holding leases of over 21 years who had failed 
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. By applying for registration of title after 12 years adverse possession under the current law or under the 
right to apply for registration after 10 years under the LRA 2002. 
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. See below. Note that under the transitional provisions, an adverse possessor who has already satisfied 
the limitation period has three years from the entry into force of the Act to apply for registration as 
proprietor against either the person applying for first registration or the person seeking registration of a 
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relevant time, Schedule 12 para. 7 and para. 11. 
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. Report No. 254 at paras. 5.64 – 5.68. 
to register their titles. The Commission was clearly sympathetic to this view and resisted 
the temptation to say that such landlords should have registered, or at least should have 
employed competent lawyers. In the result, the overriding status of such persons is 
removed, with the Commission rightly noting that the risk of “hard cases” will be much 
reduced when full e-conveyancing takes hold. At that time it will not be possible to create 
long leasehold interests without electronic registration so the problem of the valid, but 
unregistered and non-overriding long lease will disappear. There will be no lease to 
protect. Of course, there may be other cases where the removal of overriding status 
causes hardship – e.g. a landlord of an intermediate equitable lease of seven years or less 
who has further sub-let45  - but on balance this seems again to be a fair compromise 
between the need to produce an accurate register and the claims of those with adverse 
rights over the land.46 
 Fourthly and finally, there are other miscellaneous rights omitted from Schedules 
1 and 3 that currently have a home in s.70(1) LRA 1925. Chancel repair liabilities (see s. 
70(1)(c) LRA 1925) are not found in either Schedule because they are no longer 
enforceable following the Court of Appeal’s decision in Aston Cantlow etc PCC v 
Wallbank47 that such liabilities (being in the nature of a public tax on private land) are not 
compatible with human rights obligations.48 In addition, rights guaranteed under 
s.70(1)(h) LRA 1925, being rights in respect of possessor, qualified or good leasehold 
title that are excepted from the effect of registration are no longer overriding interests. 
This is simply because the type of rights that could bind the registered proprietor of such 
a “limited” estate as overriding interests are in any event binding elsewhere under the 
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. This person is not in actual occupation and has no title to register. Their lease would not be overriding 
under Schedule 1 or 3. 
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. Under the transitional provisions, any person holding an overriding interest by virtue of receipt of rent 
and profits will continue to do so under Schedule 3 until they cease to receive such rent and profits, 
Schedule 12, para. 8 LRA 2002. 
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. [2001] 3 WLR 1323. 
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.  It seems that an appeal to the House of Lords is due to be heard shortly (leave given [2002] 1 WLR 713) 
and it may be that the Law Commission’s pragmatic decision not to deal with such liabilities will be 
regretted. 
legislation.49 In essence, this tidies up an anomaly under the 1925 legislation the reason 
for which was not apparent.50 
  
(ii) Short legal leases  
 
Paragraphs 1 of Schedules 1 and 3 of the 2002 Act respectively provide that legal leases 
not exceeding 7 years from the date of the grant shall override a first registration or a 
registered disposition. Although there are some exceptions where overriding status is 
denied even for these short leases (the more so for Schedule 3), this is the obvious 
counterpart to s. 70(1)(k) LRA 1925, save that the qualifying period is reduced from the 
21 years of the earlier statute.51 The rationale is both practical and designed to support the 
e-conveyancing revolution. It seems that the average length of a business lease is now 
some ten years and it is undesirable that this most common of legal estates should escape 
substantive registration. Likewise, not only does the existence of large numbers of 
binding longer leases impair the integrity of the register, the advent of e-conveyancing, 
with its “simultaneous” registration/creation provisions will provide a simple and 
relatively inexpensive way of bringing these rights on to the register. Consequently, 
under the LRA 2002, the leasehold estate that may be registered with its own title is 
pitched at leases of over 7 years.52 Indeed, as is also well known, the Law Commission 
hope that it will be possible to reduce both qualifying periods still further so that 
eventually there will be complete symmetry between the rules governing the formal 
creation of legal leases and their registration. Hence, in due course, it is anticipated that 
only legal leases for three years or less will qualify as overriding interests (this being the 
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 . Under ss. 20(2), (3) & 23(2)(3)(4) LRA 1925 and see section 12(6)(7)(8) LRA 2002. 
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. Report No. 271, para. 2.103 et seq. and Report No. 254 para. 5.79. 
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. Under the transitional provisions, legal leases between 7 and 21 years will remain as overriding interests, 
Schedule 12, para. 12 LRA 2002, but an assignment of such a lease with more than 7 years left to run will 
indeed trigger its registration: see section 4(2)(b) which identifies such leases as qualifying estates for the 
purposes of the registration requirement of section 4(1)(a) LRA 2002. 
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. An amendment to the Bill pitching the qualifying period at 14 years was defeated in Parliament. With 
respect to its proposers, there seemed little to justify this save only an unquantified fear about “the costs” 
and a luddite fear of the dangers of e-conveyancing. 
period for which no formality is required create a legal estate). All other legal leases will 
be electronically registrable as a condition of their existence. Without doubt, this change 
will go a long way to achieving the aims of the 2002 Act and the introduction of e-
conveyancing should itself ensure that the Registry is not drowned in the flood of new 
registrable titles. For sure, the simple volume of such titles is going to increase, with 
consequential increased burdens on the resources of the Registry, but the burden will 
become unmanageable only if this provision is brought into effect significantly before the 
introduction of e-conveyancing. As to the exceptions where overriding status is denied to 
short leases, these are specific rather than indicative of some general policy. They are 
fully explained in Law Comm. Report No. 271 and the Explanatory Notes to the Act. 
Thus, as against first registration (Schedule 1), a reversionary legal lease taking effect in 
possession more than 3 months after the date of grant, a legal lease granted under the 
right to buy provisions out an unregistered legal estate and a legal lease granted to a 
former secure tenant under a preserved right to buy out of an unregistered legal estate 
must all be completed by registration.53 The last two already are excluded from the 
category of overriding interests54 and the exclusion of reversionary leases is because 
many are hard to discover and the 2002 Act vigorously pursues a policy of denying 
overriding status to undiscoverable rights. The three exceptions also apply to Schedule 3 
rights,55 together with such short leases (i.e. those not exceeding 7 years) as amount to a 
registrable disposition and so require registration for completion.56 In essence, these 
additional exceptions for which overriding status is denied are the registered land version 
of the previous three exceptions (i.e. they apply where the relevant grant is out of a 
registered estate) plus a “discontinuous lease”, otherwise known as a time share legal 
lease where possession is exclusive for set periods, but where those periods are not 
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 . Section 4(1)(b)(d)(e)LRA 2002. 
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.  See Housing Act 1985. 
55
. Such reversionary leases cannot be overriding interests under the actual occupation provisions of 
Schedule 3, being expressly excluded, Schedule 3 para. 2(d) 
56
. Schedule 3, para. 1(b), referring to “registrable disposition” under section 27(2) LRA 2002. 
continuous57 and a legal lease of a franchise or manor (where this is the relevant 
registered estate).58 
 
(iii) Actual occupation under the LRA 2002 
 
The provisions concerning the overriding status of the rights of persons in “actual 
occupation” are central to the attempt in the 2002 Act to diminishing the range and scope 
of unregistered interests that might bind a purchaser of land. Not only are these rights 
common, and under current law act as a  positive disincentive to registration,59 they 
would seriously jeopardise the effectiveness of e-conveyancing. Their very existence 
requires a physical inspection of the land in order to discover the occupation. 
Consequently, while the Law Commission was clear that, as a category, they should 
remain a feature of the 2002 Act,60 the pressure for reform was considerable. In 
particular, it was believed imperative to ensure that unregistered and undiscoverable 
overriding interests should not affect a purchaser.61  
As to specifics, mention has been made already of the removal of the “rents and 
profits” limb of s. 70(1)(g) for both Schedule 1 and Schedule 3 rights.62 Also excluded 
from both Schedules are rights arising under the Settled Land Act 1925, mirroring the 
position under the current law63 and, in any event, such rights will become rarer under the 
terms of the Trusts of Land etc. Act 1996. Similarly applicable to both Schedules, and 
representing a change in the law, is the proviso that rights of persons in actual occupation 
are overriding only in so far as they relate to the land occupied by the claimant: in other 
words, the legal extent of the interest that overrides under paragraphs 2 of Schedules 1 
and 3 is to be co-terminus with the extent of the actual occupation. This is a deliberate 
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. Section 86(2) LRA 1925. 
reversal of Ferrishurst Ltd v Wallcite Ltd64 and is the clearest possible indication that the 
role of “actual occupation” now is to serve as a warning to a prospective purchaser of the 
existence of adverse rights. Thus, the policy is that only those rights fortified by 
discoverable and relevant actual occupation should be overriding. As the Law 
Commission suggest, this may have been the law prior to Ferrishurst65 and given the lack 
of cases raising the issue, it is unlikely to cause much hardship to disappointed claimants. 
It is not demeaning the reform to say it is in the “tidying up” category rather than 
representing a major policy shift.  
 The same cannot be said of the re-definition of “actual occupation” under 
Schedule 3 of the Act. Although applicable only to Schedule 3 rights this is a major 
policy shift. Under the current s.70 (1)(g) LRA 1925, the rights of persons in actual 
occupation are overriding interests whether or not they discoverable by a purchaser. 
Hence, the undiscoverable right can bind a purchaser and the purchaser is denied the 
opportunity of walking away from the purchase or taking steps to avoid the overriding 
interest.66 Under Schedule 3, rights of persons in actual occupation are nevertheless 
excluded from overriding status in two cases: first, where enquiries were made of the 
right holder and he failed to disclose the right in circumstances where he could 
reasonably be expected to do so; and secondly, where the right holder’s actual occupation 
would not have been obvious on a reasonably careful inspection of the land and the 
person who might be bound did not have “actual knowledge” of the interest at the time of 
the disposition. The first of these is a reformulation of s.70(1)(g), but it is not so absolute 
in its penalty for failure to disclose.67 Thus, the right holder loses overriding status (after 
failure to disclose) only if disclosure could reasonably be expected to be made. So, for 
example, where the right holder did not know, and could not reasonably be expected to 
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. [1999] Ch 355. The claimant enjoyed a right extending to the entirety of the premises but was in actual 
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overriding interest. 
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. The qualification does not limit Schedule 1 rights because the act of first registration should not change 
the extent to which the applicant for first registration is bound by pre-existing rights. Hence, disclosure is 
irrelevant in respect of rights that then exist and even if the applicant does not know of them. 
know that they actually had a right (e.g. in cases of uncrystallised estoppel perhaps?), 
failure to disclose when asked does not result in loss of overriding status. While this is a 
welcome reform – and to some extent the counterpart of  making inchoate estoppels 
proprietary (s. 116 LRA 2002) – it may well lead to a certain amount of litigation. For 
example, is it “reasonable” to expect disclosure when the right holder knows that the 
consequences of disclosure will be the loss of the family home because the purchaser will 
take steps to acquire the property free from the right? Presumably it is, because otherwise 
it will always be permitted to withhold disclosure if that would result in the loss of a 
property right and that would defeat the point of the provision. However, the 
circumstances in which a person may be asked about their rights are many and varied, 
and the introduction of  a reasonableness criterion must introduce an element of 
uncertainty.68 
 The second limitation on “actual occupation” rights under Schedule 3 is more 
controversial. It is designed, of course, to prevent the overriding status of undiscoverable 
rights: hence the actual occupation (not the right) must be “obvious” on a reasonably 
careful inspection of the land and the interest must not be within the “actual knowledge” 
of the person affected. There are two broad points of interest here. First, how valid is the 
principle behind Schedule 3 that it is desirable to avoid the bindingness of undiscoverable 
rights and, secondly, is para. 2 of Schedule 3 likely to be effective in practice. 
As to the first issue, there is something in the psyche of property lawyers that 
rebels against a purchaser being bound by rights whose existence they could not possibly 
discover – even though this could have been true of “legal rights” in unregistered land.69 
We must be careful, however, to distinguish undiscoverable rights from undiscovered 
ones. There are legions of cases under the LRA 1925 where a purchaser failed to discover 
an overriding interest – often through simple incompetence. The early mortgage cases are 
good examples where sloppy lending practices or the desire to offer mortgages as quickly 
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. Of course, the assumption is that because legal rights are generally created formally, their existence will 
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as possible without regard to the consequences resulted in a plethora of Boland type 
cases. Indeed, it is not stretching a point to say that these discoverable, but undiscovered 
interests led to a litigation industry in the law of consent and undue influence when the 
lenders did became wise to the problem. By way of contrast, there are relatively few 
cases turning on the truly undiscoverable overriding interest: that is, cases where any 
reasonably prudent purchaser simply could not have discovered the existence of an 
adverse right and so never had the opportunity to take avoiding action. We might include 
in the list Ferrishurst v Wallcite (now dealt with as above), Chokkar v Chokkar 70(the 
hidden wife in hospital), Kling v Keston71 (the apparently unoccupied garage) and, more 
recently Malory v Cheshire Homes72 (actual occupation through the erection of a fence 
by the claimant on land believed to belong to the vendor). Others are harder to come by: 
indeed, so hard that the various Law Commission Reports offers little evidence from the 
case law that there is a problem (as opposed to expressing their and others inherent 
dislike of such hidden rights).73 Moreover, it is not the case that the e-conveyancing 
imperative necessarily requires the hard stance of Schedule 3. It is the existence of all 
types of interest that override that affect e-conveyancing so dramatically and the relative 
scarcity of truly undiscoverable interests is hardly likely to have a significant impact. In 
other words, perhaps this is a reform born of reaction rather than analysis. Even then, 
assuming we accept that it is desirable to prevent a purchaser being bound by an 
undiscoverable right (even though it happens rarely), it is arguable that Schedule 3 should 
have included some reference to the reasons why the right (or the actual occupation 
which protects it) is undiscoverable. If the undiscoverability is because of the nature of 
the right (e.g. Ferrishurst) or blameless chance (Kling), the balance may be thought to lay 
with purchaser for this supports the free alienability of land. Where, however, it is 
because of some devious act of the vendor (as in Chokkar), the absolute rule in Schedule 
3 serves only to punish the innocent. In short, given that it was thought necessary to 
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. See Law Comm No. 271 at para. 8.62 and Law Comm No. 254, referring to the obligations to disclose 
latent defects of title. 
remove overriding status from the undiscoverable right, we should recognise that this 
embodies a policy choice in favour of the purchaser. Given that it does, there are other 
policy factors that, in some cases, might re-dress the balance in favour of the 
undiscoverable occupier. These are now excluded by the firm rule in Schedule 3 and the 
Act may well be the poorer for it. 
 Secondly, even if we accept that change was necessary, is the form of Schedule 3 
the best that could be achieved. It may be, but perhaps the jury is still out. As noted, it is 
the actual occupation (not the right) that must be “obvious” on a “reasonably careful 
inspection” of the land. This then, is not intended to be a re-incarnation of the doctrine of 
notice and we can but hope that Her Majesty’s judges do not interpret it this way.74 These 
judges will, of course, have to determine what “obvious” means, along with what 
amounts to a “reasonably careful” inspection, and as each case must be determined by its 
own facts, this Schedule may well turn out to be a litigation generator. This will be bad 
enough, but the impulse to litigate is likely to come from purchasers, especially 
institutional lenders, who will argue that the actual occupation was not patent and that 
they should escape being affected by the right. Moreover, if courts take a narrow view of 
the paragraph, there may well be an erosion of the current law and perhaps even the 
undiscovered (but discoverable) occupation may not be thought sufficient to generate an 
interest that overrides. This will not be consistent with the purpose behind the Schedule, 
but it is a fair bet that many of the Boland type cases would have been decided in favour 
of the lender (simply because the lender did not discover the occupation) had Schedule 3 
been the operative provision instead of s. 70(1)(g).75 The author does, of course, accept 
that many of these fears may prove unfounded. However, it is submitted that this change 
to the “actual occupation” provisions is driven more by a desire to protect purchasers 
from anticipated fears than by any overbearing practical considerations. It seems the right 
thing to have done. Let us hope that it turns out to be so. 
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(iv) Legal easements 
 
Another change to the scope of overriding interests currently found in the LRA 1925 
concerns legal easements. We have noted above that all equitable easements as a class are 
now excluded from the Schedules and in fact even the provisions concerning legal 
easements are limited in scope. As regards Schedule 1 interests, all legal easements are 
included, once again following the policy that an act of first registration should neither 
enhance nor restrict the bindingness of a proprietary right. Legal easements would have 
bound in the law of unregistered title, hence they must bind at first registration. However, 
by way of contrast, Schedule 3 is more narrowly drawn than Schedule 1 and not all legal 
easements will override a registered disposition of a registrable estate.76 Once again, this 
change is driven by the policy of ensuring that only discoverable rights may be overriding 
or, in the case of easements, also because they are used relatively frequently.77 
Consequently, legal easements will override a registered disposition under Schedule 3 if, 
but only if, the easement is registered under the Commons Registration Act 1965, or it is 
actually known of by the purchaser, or it is obvious on a reasonably careful inspection of 
the land, or it has been exercised within one year prior to the relevant disposition.78 These 
are alternatives so, for example, an undiscoverable but used easement (possibly 
underground television cables) will be protected. In truth, the list of qualifying legal 
easements is comprehensive and it may well be that few are denied overriding status in 
practice by these provisions. Of course, there may be some interpretative difficulties (as 
before) over “obvious on a reasonably careful inspection”, especially in relation to long-
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disused land where the “one year use” proviso may not apply. All in all, however, when 
taken against the policy aims of the legislation and the dictates of e-conveyancing, of 
itself this again represents a fair compromise between purchasers and users of land.79 
Indeed, we should also note that in time the category of “legal” easements that are 
unregistered but overriding will shrink. Under the e-conveyancing provisions and the 
formality provisions of the LRA 2002,80 no expressly created legal easement will be able 
to exist at all unless it is created electronically and entered on the register. They will not 
override because they will not exist. Thus, the category will be limited to impliedly 
created legal easements and even then the standard conveyancing practice of excluding 
the creation of implied easements on the sale or lease of land means that the category will 
be small. 
 
(v) Time restricted rights 
 
Finally in this analysis of interests that override under the LRA 2002, we should note that 
the status of a group of rights as overriding a first registration or a registered disposition 
is time limited. Under section 117 of the Act, five types of right will cease to have 
overriding status both under Schedule 1 and Schedule 3 ten years after the Act is brought 
into force. These are a miscellaneous category of rights, some feudal, some historic and 
includes franchises, a manorial right, a crown rent, a non-statutory right in respect of a 
sea wall or river embankment and a corn rent.81 They are to be phased out on the ground 
that most can no longer be created and that those persons with the benefit of them should 
be aware of their existence and of the need to enter them on the register. The last point is, 
of course, debatable, but the Law Commission believe that the removal of the status of 
such rights is justified as matter of land registration policy and will not contravene human 
rights provisions.82 Once again, while the consultation process revealed this to be a 
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. Identified in paragraphs 10 to 14 of Schedules 1 and 3 LRA 2002. 
82
. Report No. 271 para. 8.88 et seq. 
supportable hope, only time will tell whether the relevant provisions will be free from 
human rights attack. 
 
B: The emasculation of adverse possession in relation to registered land 
 
Part 9 of the 2002 Act contains provisions relating to the operation of principles of 
adverse possession in relation to land of registered title. As is now well known, the 
essential feature of this new system is that no period of adverse possession will of itself 
give a title to the possessor and in this sense, there is no period of limitation in respect of 
claims to recover possession of registered land.83 In its place, an adverse possessor is 
given the right to apply to be registered as proprietor after a minimum period of ten years 
adverse possession, itself to be calculated according to the current principles.84 This 
application requires the Registrar to notify the registered proprietor (and certain other 
persons85) of the application. The persons notified then have a further period to be 
determined by Rules86 to serve a counter-notice. The effect of the adverse possessor’s 
application is then decided. So, if the persons notified do not serve a counter-notice 
claiming the benefit of the Act, the applicant “is entitled” to be registered as proprietor of 
the estate in respect of which he applied.87 If an appropriate counter-notice is served, then 
subject to three exceptions, the application to register must be rejected and the registered 
proprietor is given two years to take possession proceedings against the adverse 
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. Schedule 6 para. 2(1). 
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. Schedule 6 para. 4 LRA 2002 
possessor. Failure to take such proceedings entitles the adverse possessor to apply for, 
and be given, registration at the expiry of the two-year period.88 
 This simple scheme does, of course, mean the end of adverse possession as a 
threat to the security of registered title, save in cases where the registered proprietor 
genuinely has no use for the land (and does not wish to keep it) or if one of the 
exceptions applies. Adverse possession for any length of time (e.g. 50 years) will not of 
itself confer title (there is no limitation period) and the registered proprietor will always 
be warned before the possibility of losing their estate arises. 89 Even then, in most cases a 
further two years period of grace will exist. A direct and intended consequence will be 
the voluntary registration of large areas of unregistered land, especially in those cases 
where the estate owner has difficulty keeping track of the state of their land and wishes to 
utilise the warnings given by the registrar.90 
Once again, this radical reform is justified by the paramount policy of bringing 
maximum security to registered titles so that they may be dealt with efficiently under e-
conveyancing. It is also a reflection of  a political philosophy that adverse possession is 
“land theft” and that it is inherently inconsistent with a registration system. Of course, 
there is merit in both these views: modern expositions of the law on adverse possession 
appear to have favoured the rights of possessors over the rights of paper owners (making 
successful claims all the more likely)91 and the existence of an off-register mechanism for 
destroying titles seems to make a mockery of the state guarantee of title in registered 
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land.92 On the other hand, the social and economic justifications for principles of adverse 
possession have been well documented93 and instead of “land theft”, adverse possession 
can be seen as encouraging “productive land use”. Again, there is nothing inherently 
contradictory in having principles of adverse possession operate in registered land, at 
least if those principles are seen positively as a method of transferring title from one 
person to another94 instead of a method of unfairly snatching it from them. It is a matter 
of perception, not of incontrovertible logic. Consequently, given that the Act has chosen 
to emasculate adverse possession – and so favours one policy perspective – we must be 
alive to the possibility that there will be some creative interpretation of the relevant 
provisions by a differently minded judiciary. 
It is submitted that this battle will be fought around the interpretation of the three 
exceptions referred to above: that is, those cases where despite the registered proprietor 
serving a counter notice, the applicant may be registered as proprietor without waiting for 
a further two years to see if the paper owner commences possession proceedings. The 
three situations are: first, that it would be unconscionable because of estoppel for the 
registered proprietor to dispossess the applicant and the applicant should in all the 
circumstances be registered;95 secondly, where the applicant is for some other reason 
entitled to be registered as proprietor;96 and thirdly, where there is a boundary dispute 
concerning adjoining land, the applicant believing for at least ten years that the relevant 
land was his and where the estate to which the application relates has been registered for 
at least one year.97 The third of these is relatively straightforward and admits of little 
doubt. It does provide comfort to those who argue that adverse possession plays a vital 
role in the settlement of minor boundary disputes. It does, and will continue to do so 
under the provisions of the 2002 Act. However, the first two exceptions are of a different 
order. The first is the most open–ended and may well prove to be the opening through 
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which determined judges drive the horse and cart. In principle, it concerns cases of 
estoppel, arising from unfairness or injustice and Law Commission Report No. 271 gives 
various examples.98 In practice, however, not only is the very scope of estoppel at best 
fluid and at worse entirely discretionary, the words of para. 5(2) of Schedule 6 admit of a 
wide variety of interpretations. It is even possible that the courts might develop a de facto 
limitation period where (say) 20 years adverse possession raises a presumption that an 
estoppel exists so that it would be proper (absent special circumstances) to grant an 
application for registration by an adverse possessor even if the paper owner did serve a 
counter-notice. This is not far fetched, as the history of the LRA 1925 is littered with 
imaginative interpretations of apparently clear statute in order to achieve what the court 
thinks is a desirable social goal. Even the second exception –  that the applicant is for 
some other reason entitled to the land – which the Law Commission regards “more 
straightforward”99 is not limited by the legislation to the examples provided by the Law 
Commission in its Report. What is meant is that if the adverse possessor has some other 
right to the land irrespective of their adverse possession – such as under a will or 
constructive trust – then registration as proprietor may be given on first application 
despite opposition from the paper owner.  Note, however, that not all these “other rights” 
are as concrete and as certain as a right under a testamentary disposition. It takes no 
imagination at all to foresee a decision where first the adverse possessor is said to be the 
beneficiary under some kind of constructive trust  (the “other right”) and the reasons for 
the imposition of the trust in the first place are then used a second time to justify 
registration as proprietor under the statutory exception. Perhaps this is what is intended, 
but the provision is opaque. 
Once again, the point here is not that the provisions of the LRA 2002 are fatally 
flawed or misguided. As regards adverse possession they reflect a powerfully supported 
policy position and, while not everyone may agree with it, that policy cannot be 
dismissed lightly. It can, of course, be challenged, and some might argue that the 
provisions on adverse possession in the Act were not actually necessary for an effective 
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reform of the land registration system, even when considering the imperatives of e-
conveyancing. The point is rather that if these doubts are shared by those responsible for 
implementing and interpreting the LRA 2002, especially in cases of apparent hardship 
and unfairness, then we may see the re-emergence through imaginative interpretation of 
the legislation of a de facto  limitation period in registered land. 
 
C: Formalities for the creation of rights: new procedures and estoppel 
 
The final issue covered in this essay concerns the requirements introduced by LRA 2002 
for the creation and transfer of proprietary rights and their relation – if any – to 
proprietary estoppel. In turn, this is related directly to the provisions concerning e-
conveyancing and in this regard much remains as yet uncertain. Detailed provision will 
be made by the Rules and the consultation exercise for the first set of Rules started in the 
summer of 2002. Perforce we must deal at this stage with the principles established by 
the Act in the knowledge that they may be tempered or strengthened  by the anticipated 
land registration rules. 
 The LRA 2002 is explicit that e-conveyancing means much more than using 
electronic media to communicate with the Land Registry. Schemes of that ilk exist 
already. The scheme of e-conveyancing proposed by the Act is far more radical and will 
result in dramatic changes to the way property rights are created and transferred. In time, 
it will render the distinction between “legal” and equitable” property rights largely 
irrelevant in land of registered title. The first step will be the implementation of 
legislation permitting the conclusion of valid contracts and deeds in electronic form. For 
contracts, this will occur through an Order made under section 8 of the Electronic 
Communications Act 2000, inserting a new clause 2A into the Law of Property 
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989 authorising the conclusion of contracts by 
electronic media. For deeds, the Order may insert a new section 144A into the Land 
Registration Act 1925 effectively permitting the electronic creation of documents that are 
to have the effect of a deed, although this will not be needed if section 91 LRA 2002 is 
brought into force as this has the same effect. In other words, the effect of these changes 
will be that it will be possible to create or transfer proprietary rights either by material 
(written) contract or deed or by electronic media having the same effect. 
At first, these material and non-material contracts/deed will exist side by side and 
the registration of the contract/deed (however brought into existence) will be required in 
the same circumstances and for the same reasons as under the current law.100 In short, 
there will simply be another way of executing a valid contract or deed.101 However, in 
due course, this dual scheme will be superseded by a more radical system. When section 
93 LRA enters force, it will be possible to specify that certain dispositions “only have 
effect” if  they are created electronically and are electronically registered. This is critical 
and lies at the heart of the e-conveyancing system. It means that it will not be possible to 
create certain types of proprietary right unless this is done electronically and providing 
they are simultaneously electronically registered. In effect, the act of electronic 
registration will be the act of creation. The rights subject to these provisions could in due 
course encompass all registered dispositions and all third party rights capable of 
protection by the entry of a notice on the register.  
 Clearly, this represents a profound change in the way we perceive and create 
proprietary rights and obligations. At present, failure to register a properly created right 
that requires such registration to exist as a legal interest renders that interest purely 
equitable. Likewise, failure to use the proper form for the creation of a legal right may 
nevertheless create an equitable one.102 Indeed, despite being purely equitable, these 
transactions do create obligations between the original parties and can in some 
circumstances bind third parties.103 Under the fully operative provisions of the LRA 
2002, this will not be the case. The attempted creation/transfer of a property right without 
using the electronic formalities will be without effect. It will not create a legal right (even 
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if a paper deed is used) and it will not create an equitable right. Failure to use the 
formalities required by s. 93 renders the transaction without legal effect and there is no 
fall back position. Consequently, there is little relevance in the distinction between legal 
and equitable rights. Instead, such rights either exist – having been created electronically 
– or they do not. 
Of course, if e-conveyancing is to become both a reality and the norm, there is 
little choice but to adopt such a robust attitude. There can be no half-way house.104 No 
doubt, however, there will be many occasions after the entry into force of section 93 LRA 
2002 where private individuals use a paper deed or a written contract fully believing that 
they are creating something binding between themselves and perhaps for the future. It 
may even be that property professionals are slow to appreciate this dramatic change. 
Furthermore, the position is not made any easier by the fact that access to the electronic 
system – and hence the ability to create property rights – will be restricted to those with 
Network Access Agreements. Thus, not only are private individuals denied a simple 
method of creating or transferring rights in their own property (they cannot use paper), 
they cannot even use the electronic method without either engaging a property 
professional or going direct to the Land Registry. In such a climate, it is likely that a way 
will be found to give limited affect to the actions of parties genuinely attempting to create 
property rights, albeit that they failed miserably. The present author has argued elsewhere 
that proprietary estoppel provides the perfect vehicle for this, being the traditional 
antidote to lack of formality in dealings with land.105 Without rehearsing those arguments 
in full, it seems likely that proprietary estoppel will be used both to cure defects in the 
creation of rights where the relevant electronic formalities have not been observed and, 
more importantly, to ensure that equitable versions of rights do exist when the dictates of 
section 93 are not observed. Thus, written agreements (be they in the form of a “contract” 
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or a “deed”) may well be ineffective under s.93 LRA 2002, but may be re-born under the 
rubric of proprietary estoppel. Perhaps, indeed, this is foreseen by the legislation itself. 
As we know, s. 116 LRA 2002 now makes it clear that rights created by estoppel are 
inherently proprietary, even before they are made concrete by order of the court. 
Consequently, these inchoate but proprietary equities can bind purchasers of land through 
Schedules 1 and 3, almost certainly under the actual occupation provisions. This has 
already been accepted in relation to s. 70(1)(g) LRA 1925 – see Lloyd v Dugdale106 – and 




There is a great deal more to the Land Registration Act 2002 than considered in this 
paper. The provisions on alteration of the register (formerly rectification), the entry of 
notices and restrictions (formerly minor interests), the powers of registered proprietors, 
issues of priority, charges and matters relating to the Crown occupy large portions of the 
Act. As with the provisions analysed above, they are fully argued in Law Commission 
Reports No. 254 and 271 and, at least to this author appear to be well thought out and 
overwhelmingly sensible. As ever, they are bent towards the goal of an effective and 
complete register that can support an advanced system of e-conveyancing.  
 It would, however, be surprising if such a mammoth undertaking as the LRA 
2002 did not generate critical comment and the argument above has attempted to 
highlight areas of current or possible future concern, particularity with regard to the Act’s 
reforms  of substantive principles of land law. The history of the 1925 legislation teaches 
us that a system so overly structured to support the free and uncomplicated alienability of 
land can be tempered – sometimes in the teeth of clear statutory words – in favour of 
occupiers of land and other third parties who appear to “deserve” protection whatever the 
statute might say. There is no doubt in the mind of the present author that the same will 
happen again with the LRA 2002. Whether that will occur in respect of the provisions 
discussed above is an open question. However, given that so much of the Act is designed 
to support e-conveyancing, but given also that the substantive changes to property law 
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necessary to support it will (indeed must) occur before that system becomes a reality, 
there will be a period of time during which the substantive law has changed but the 
system it is designed to support is not in place. That may well be the time of most risk, or 
most opportunity, depending on one’s point of view. How the substantive reforming 
provisions of the LRA 2002 will be interpreted without the protective cloak of e-
conveyancing is one of the most intriguing questions facing land registration in the 
twenty-first century. Will they be interpreted and applied in support of e-conveyancing or 
will they by design or accident be interpreted in a way that reduces its effect? 
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